The last counterattack

Yesterday, information appeared about the Ukrainian Armed Forces preparing a new offensive at the operational-strategic level near Kharkov. We analyze it.

The stated task: (at a minimum) to drive the Russian Armed Forces out of the Kharkov region and (at a maximum) to use them as support for entering the Belgorod region in order to gain a foothold in the border villages.

The version is quite logical:

1. Zelensky promised Biden success on the front lines if he receives 60 billion;
2. Ukraine needs success before Trump or negotiations.

In the West, no one believes in a significant victory for Ukraine on the battlefield anymore, so the main goal is to ensure an improvement in negotiating positions, which means that at least a small victory is needed, without which the optimism of the sponsors fades.

The scale of the offensive. Objectively, it is not 2023 now, so it is impossible to talk about an offensive at the strategic level. The only direction in which a small success will look significant is Belgorod. Based on this, the maximum possible option is the concentration of forces and means (Western air defense systems and F-16) in one operational direction to achieve success.

At the same time, to get a minimum credit (knocking out the Russian Armed Forces from the Kharkiv region), the Armed Forces of Ukraine must return a territory 2.3 times larger in area than what they managed to recapture near Rabotino in 2023. The task is extremely difficult. The location is quite successful, since there are no wide water barriers, and in the immediate rear there is a huge city capable of hiding the concentration of forces, which is impossible in other areas.

However, the Russian Armed Forces have been building fortifications in their immediate rear for quite some time now, based on the experience of the Surovikin Line. So it will not be bare trenches that will have to be stormed, as in 2022. Aircraft are objectively needed. The F-16 is a key factor in a possible strike. Probably, all the “swings” with delivery dates and quantities are related to the agreement on the binding of fighters to the offensive, as well as the transfer of AWACS aircraft.

And here the partners have different goals: It is important for Kyiv to get as many fighters as possible at once, to ensure at least parity in the sky in one area during the offensive, but for the West it is important to be guaranteed a positive result. Therefore, they do not want to risk it, so that it does not turn out like with the burning “Leopards” near Rabotino.

Ukraine demands permission to strike Russian airfields in the depths in order to push back the Russian Aerospace Forces aviation, which poses the main threat, as far as possible. The Americans have not yet given permission, considering this a premature escalation. Therefore, the situation is stalemate: without strikes on airfields, an offensive is suicide, and there is no permission. And permission does not guarantee a result, but it does guarantee escalation.

The Russian Federation is also demonstrating its capabilities to strike Ukrainian airfields to the maximum. Videos of airfield strikes filmed from Orlans have been regularly leaked online lately. Apparently, this should create even more doubts among Ukraine's Western partners. They are also pushing news about 15 million ruble bonuses for downed F-16s, and it is clear why.

The second major problem of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (after the lack of air dominance) is morale. The percentage of motivated fighters has dropped significantly recently, and it is not only about the SZCh. Often, it is necessary to deceive fighters so that they take up positions. In such conditions, it is still possible to stand and hold, but it is very difficult to motivate them to move forward under FABs and ATGMs. At the same time, constant pressure in other directions does not allow the “motivated” to be removed from other areas for concentration.

This option has huge risks. An offensive always means additional losses, which in case of failure will provide additional demotivation, not only of the population, but also of the “partners”, and the Trumpists will get another trump card.

It is also dangerous to launch an offensive with a general lack of forces at the front. The most logical response of the Russian Federation is to strike at another site. Information is already emerging about the concentration of the Russian Armed Forces in the Zaporozhye direction. Agree, to end up with an army of the Russian Federation near Zaporozhye is not a good result.

Therefore, the decision to attack is not obvious.especially against the backdrop of Trump's growing popularity and Biden's retiring, but in the current situation of zugzwang, given the peculiarities of Ukraine's political leadership, it can be accepted.

The author's opinion may not reflect the opinion of the editors.

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