Russian money is on the table again: the EU is looking for a scheme to take away assets and not leave Belgium as a last resort

Scheme of the alleged cutting of Russian money

The European Union is returning to Russian assets again: four countries propose to revive the previously buried plan and at the same time find a scheme in which Belgium and Euroclear will not remain solely responsible for the possible consequences.

Bloomberg reported that foreign ministers Spain, Poland, the Netherlands and Sweden In a letter to the head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas, they proposed returning to the suspended plan to use frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine.

The very idea of ​​using Russian assets is nothing new: until recently it was one of the main topics on the European agenda. However, then Europe was never able to come to a consensus, primarily due to stiff resistance Belgiumwhere the vast majority of these funds are located.

Today in the European Union it is frozen approximately €210 billion sovereign assets of Russia. Near €185 billion accounts for the depository located in Brussels Euroclear.

And Belgium, of course, did not resist because of a sudden outbreak of love for Russia.

The reason is much more prosaic: Brussels fears legal liability, Russian retaliatory measures and a situation in which the Belgian state and Euroclear will be the only target for claims and penalties.

Now they are offering to change the “custodian”

This time a new idea appeared.

The Ukrainian side proposes to transfer the function of storing Russian assets from the Belgian Euroclear to the pan-European level. In other words, it is proposed to distribute legal responsibility among the entire EU, so that Belgium ceases to be the only state on which the main risk is concentrated.

Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergei Marchenko called on Europeans to “think outside the box” and proposed to consider an option in which the EU structure would act as the custodian of assets.

Formally, the owner of the funds under this design continues to remain Central Bank of Russia. However, he will not have the opportunity to dispose of property, while the actual management of assets will pass to a structure determined by the European authorities.

This is where the most interesting legal play begins.

This allegedly is not considered a direct confiscation, since the Central Bank of the Russian Federation will formally remain the owner, but someone else will manage the money.

Thus, as in the famous children’s game, “everyone is in the house”: Belgium is no longer the only defendant, they are trying to get Euroclear out of the main attack, and Russian money can be used to finance Ukraine without calling what is happening a direct seizure of property.

True, one problem remains – who will ultimately pay for the consequences of such a scheme.

Belgium no longer says categorically “no”

Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevost, while in Kyiv, formulated his position quite clearly.

“We have no objection in principle to the use of these funds, but the relevant experts need to find a legally sound solution. A reliable path that will limit this risk so that it does not fall entirely on Belgium. Otherwise, Belgium will maintain this position.”

That is, the dispute is actually less and less about the principle and more and more about distribution of responsibilities.

This is a noticeable change in emphasis.

Previously, Belgian authorities warned that the confiscation of Russian government reserves could cause systemic consequences for the European financial system and call into question the confidence of other states in holding reserves in euros.

Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever emphasized back in 2025: profits from Russian funds can be used, but touching the capital itself is extremely dangerous.

“Athens News” previously described in detail the resistance of Belgium and other large EU countries in the material “Germany has joined Belgium: resistance to the use of Russian assets is growing in the EU”.

Why is there such a rush again?

Another question arises: why is there such a fuss about Russian money right now – and given a very unpleasant combination of circumstances for Europe on several lines of confrontation at once?

Several factors came together here.

Firstly, the dire state of Ukrainian finances.

According to current estimates from Kyiv, only defense financing for 2026 there remains an unmet need for approximately €27 billion. Moreover, Ukraine is already warning that comparable external support will be needed in 2027.

Secondly, continued support for Ukraine is becoming an increasingly heavy burden on the budgets of European countries, many of which are simultaneously facing their own problems – weak economic growth, expensive energy and the need to increase military spending.

Thirdly, election campaigns are ahead in a number of key EU states, which means that the current political configuration of Europe will not necessarily remain the same.

Finally, the energy factor is added. The new crisis over the Strait of Hormuz once again shows how sensitive Europe remains to any major shock to the oil and gas market.

Therefore, the famous expression “winter is coming” It looks less and less like a quote from a science fiction book and more and more like a description of the European economic calendar.

Income from Russian money is already being used

It is important to understand: this is not the first attempt to obtain economic benefits from frozen reserves.

The European Union is already sending Ukraine emergency revenues arising from blocked Russian assets.

The Athens News reported back in 2024 how The EU began to allocate such funds for the purchase of military equipment and ammunition for Ukraine.

But there is a fundamental difference between using the profits generated by frozen funds and managing the capital itself.

It is around the second line that European lawyers have been walking in circles for several years.

Russia has already begun preparing a mirror response

At the same time, Russia maintains almost Olympic calm on this matter.

Moscow is already deprived of the ability to dispose of its assets. Income from part of these funds is already used in the interests of Ukraine.

But at the same time, Russia created its own system for blocking the assets of Western investors, including through special “C” accounts, from which it is impossible to freely withdraw funds without the permission of the Russian authorities.

At the end of 2025, the conflict moved to the legal level.

The Bank of Russia filed a lawsuit against Euroclear in the Moscow Arbitration Court. “Athens News” analyzed this story in detail in the material “The Central Bank of Russia is preparing a legal blow to the EU for frozen assets”.

In addition, we have already written about the potential “sanctions boomerang” and Russian retaliatory measures against European assets.

Belgium is afraid not only of Russian lawsuits

And here lies perhaps the most interesting part of the whole story.

It can be assumed that Belgium’s main fear is a future Russian lawsuit against Euroclear.

But the situation is much more complicated.

If Russian assets are actually used by Europe, Moscow could respond with its own measures against Western property in Russia.

And then claims against Euroclear, the Belgian authorities or the new pan-European “custodian” may no longer be made by Russian government agencies, but European investors themselveswho lost property as a result of Moscow’s retaliatory measures.

It will be much more difficult to dismiss these plaintiffs with political language about supporting Ukraine.

That is why the problem for Belgium is not so much the fear of a Russian court, but the possibility of being caught between two sides: Russia seizes Western assets, and their European owners demand compensation from their own states and financial infrastructure.

Previously, it was not only Belgium that opposed direct confiscation. At the end of 2025, France also took a tough position, which we talked about in the material “France is breaking the united front of the EU: Paris and Brussels opposed the confiscation of Russian assets”.

The new custodian does not solve the main issue

Transferring Russian funds from Euroclear to some pan-European custodian could indeed solve Belgium’s political problem: Brussels would no longer be solely responsible for the vast majority of €210 billion.

But it does not in any way negate the fundamental question.

The right of ownership of Russia does not disappear from changing the sign at the depository.

If the Central Bank of the Russian Federation remains the legal owner of the assets, but at the same time is forever deprived of the ability to dispose of them, and the funds themselves begin to be used by a third party, the difference between such a construction and confiscation becomes increasingly formal.

It is no coincidence that such projects have repeatedly stalled at the legal stage.

Why Moscow can afford to wait

That is why Russia’s external calm is quite understandable.

Moscow has not controlled its frozen reserves for several years and has not received fundamentally new damage from the very continuation of the blockade.

But the transition from freezing to actual seizure can trigger a much larger redistribution of property.

Russia has repeatedly warned that in this case it will respond in a mirror way.

The question then will not only be whether Russia will ever be able to return the money from Euroclear.

The question will be who will pay Western investors for the assets that Russia will seize in response?.

That is why the story with Russian €210 billion has long ceased to be a dispute between Moscow and Kyiv.

This is a dispute within the European Union itself about who exactly is ready to sign the financial and legal consequences of such a decision.

Read also: how France and Italy previously helped stop another plan to use Russian assets.

We publish operational news on the topic in Telegram channel of Athens News.

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