Greece is spending more than €3 billion on the new Achilles Shield air defense systembut after signing the deal, a fundamental question remains: How independently Athens will be able to manage, modernize and develop this system without permission from Israel or the United States.
Briefly about the main thing
- The cost of the Achilles Shield program exceeds €3 billion.
- Greece states that the national circuit of governance will be under its control.
- Integration of David’s Sling with external systems requires approval from the United States.
- Finland and Slovakia independently operate purchased Israeli systems, but there is no public confirmation of the transfer of full source code to them.
- The government promises more than 25% participation by Greek industry, but the detailed structure of these contracts has not yet been publicly disclosed.
After the signing of agreements on the creation of a multi-level air and missile defense system “Shield of Achilles” The debate in Greece has shifted from the characteristics of missiles to a much more uncomfortable issue – who will really control the system at a critical moment.
The new shield should include Israeli complexes SPYDER, BARAK MX and David’s Slingradars, communications and unified command and control system.
Formally, we are talking about the national Greek system. But it is the word “national” that now requires a more precise explanation.
Dendias himself made the source code a matter of principle
Defense Minister Nikos Dendias has previously publicly stressed that Greece should not buy critical systems unless it can independently intervene in their architecture and development.
That’s why the question source code found himself at the center of the discussion.
After the deal was signed, Athens said that the Greek command and control circuit should be under national control.
But here comes an important difference: controlling your own C2 is not the same as having the full source code of all the missile systems that are connected to it.
It has not yet been publicly disclosed which program levels Greece will be able to change independently, and which will remain closed to manufacturers.
David’s Sling: using it yourself – yes, completely changing it is another question
Particularly indicative is the complex David’s Sling.
This is a joint Israeli-American development, and part of the system’s technology falls under American control.
The Israeli side confirmed that connecting David’s Sling to external government or NATO systems requires a special integration plan and coordination with the United States.
This does not mean that Greece will not be able to independently use the complex in a combat situation.
But it means something else: to change some elements of its external integration, Athens will not be completely free in its decisions.
How does this work for other buyers?
Here it is useful to look at existing export transactions.
Finland became the first foreign buyer of David’s Sling. The complex must be integrated into its national air defense system and independently operated by the Finnish armed forces.
At the same time, the sale itself required separate permission from the US government, and there is no public data on the transfer of the complete source code of the system to Finland.
A similar picture with Slovakiawhich acquired BARAK MX. The Slovak military receives its own operation of the system, training, technical support and participation of national industry, but the transfer of the full software core has also not been reported.
That is, international practice shows an important difference: a country can independently fight with a purchased system without having full technological control over its internal software.
This is why the correct question regarding the Greek deal is not “will Greece be able to press the start button”, but rather: will it be able to modernize the system itself, connect new sensors and weapons and change its architecture without coordination with suppliers?
And what then does the promised 25% mean?
The government says the participation of the Greek defense industry in the program will exceed 25%and the total volume of national work will be about €750 million.
The participation of 19 Greek companies is reported.
But a complete breakdown has not yet been publicly presented: exactly who will receive which contracts, what technologies will be transferred to Greece and what part of the work will be related to actual production and what part will be related to maintenance, installation and subcontracting.
And this is directly related to the issue of technological independence.
If Greek enterprises are involved only in maintenance and individual components, that is one thing.
If they get access to integration technologies, software interfaces and the development of a national C2, this is a completely different level of participation.
The main question is what will happen during a crisis
In peacetime, most of these restrictions may seem like technicalities.
But an air defense system is purchased precisely for the moment when the country is under threat.
And then it is fundamentally important to understand: will Greece be able to independently change the network configuration, connect an additional radar, a new aircraft, ship or other target designation source – or will some decisions require external approval?
Therefore, today the debate around the “Achilles Shield” is no longer reduced to the question of whether Israeli missiles are good.
It’s about what degree of sovereign control does Greece get for more than €3 billion?.
Editorial comment
No one argues that Greece needs modern multi-level air defense.
But with a project cost of over €3 billion, society has the right to receive very specific answers.
What kind of source code does the Greek side receive? What elements can she change on her own? What decisions regarding David’s Sling will require approval from the United States? What exactly is hidden behind the promised 25% participation of Greek industry?
The experience of Finland and Slovakia shows that a foreign buyer can independently operate an Israeli air defense system without gaining full access to its entire internal architecture.
And therefore the main question regarding the Greek deal should be very clear: does Greece simply get the right to use the Shield of Achilles on its own – or also the opportunity to develop it independently over the next decades?
For a defense system worth billions of euros, this is not a technical detail. This is a matter of national sovereignty.
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