The air war between Ukraine and Russia: in whose favor is the score

Ukraine and Russia are strengthening long-range strikes in the rear. But their effect is asymmetrical: Moscow is destroying infrastructure, and Kyiv is increasingly hitting fuel, refineries and the war economy.

In recent weeks, both Ukraine and Russia have noticeably intensified long-range strikes on each other’s rear. Russian missiles and drones are again hitting Ukrainian cities, industrial facilities and infrastructure. Ukraine, in turn, is increasingly reaching out to Russian refineries, ports, fuel storage facilities, ships and supply facilities in Crimea.

At first glance, the picture looks symmetrical: both sides cause damage, both publish statements about the defeat of “military targets,” and both accuse the enemy of attacks on civilian infrastructure. But the actual impact of these strikes on the ability to continue the war is different for Russia and Ukraine.

Ukrainian attacks on Russia have already led to fuel shortages in a number of regions, and in Crimea – also to interruptions in electricity and water. Previously “Athens News” wrote how Kyiv is expanding the geography of long-range attacks on Russian energy infrastructure: “Plunge Russia into cold and darkness”. Later, attacks on oil facilities continued, including attacks on Ust-Luga, oil refineries and terminals: Ukraine hits Russia’s oil heart.

For Moscow, this is painful not only militarily, but also economically. Russia is waging war mainly at the expense of its own resources. Therefore, attacks on oil refining, fuel logistics and ports directly affect the budget, exports, the domestic market and the ability to finance the military machine without undue pressure on the civilian sector.

Ukraine is in a different model. Its economy has been badly damaged by the war, but a significant part of its military and budgetary resources is provided by Western aid. Therefore, Russian strikes on factories, warehouses and infrastructure cause enormous damage, cause casualties and destruction, but do not always directly nullify Kyiv’s ability to fight. The holes in the budget are partially filled by the allies, and part of the military production has already been transferred or duplicated in Europe.

Three critical vulnerabilities of Ukraine

Ukraine has three points, attacks on which could really sharply weaken its military capabilities.

• The first is energy. If Russia manages to bring Ukraine to a long-term nationwide blackout, the consequences will be catastrophic: a shutdown of production, a blow to the military-industrial complex, problems with water, sewerage, heating and a mass outflow of the population.
  But throughout the war, Moscow was never able to plunge Ukraine into lasting darkness. Now the threat remains, especially against the backdrop of a shortage of air defense missiles, but the question remains open: is it even possible to shut down an entire country for a long time, connected to the European energy system and constantly repairing the network?
• The second is maritime logistics. The resumption of shipping through Ukrainian ports has become one of the factors for the stability of the economy. Danube ports are important for fuel supplies. Russia regularly attacks port infrastructure and ships, but it is difficult to completely stop maritime exports and imports.
  To destroy the port economy, it is not individual drones that are needed, but massive strikes, which Russia cannot yet deliver throughout the entire depth of the Ukrainian port system. Moscow also cannot sink civilian ships en masse without the risk of conflict with Turkey, China and other trading partners.
• The third is the production of drones. According to open data, a significant part of Ukrainian drones are still produced or assembled within the country. Russia regularly announces attacks on such targets. But the dynamics of attacks on the Russian rear shows: the Ukrainian drone vehicle has not yet been stopped.

Some of the production is dispersed, some can be restored, and components are largely tied to import chains, primarily Chinese. Therefore, even successful attacks on individual workshops do not mean automatic paralysis of the entire system.

Why bridges, gas stations and checkpoints don’t solve everything

There are other goals that are regularly discussed by Russian military channels: bridges across the Dnieper, locomotives, gas stations, water supplies, checkpoints on the western border of Ukraine.

Strikes against them can create serious problems, but do not guarantee the paralysis of Ukraine. Bridges are difficult to destroy with existing means. The railway park and gas stations can be restored. Checkpoints can be reloaded onto neighboring routes. The water supply will hit civilians first, not the front.

Even the destruction of several major bridges across the Dnieper will complicate logistics and the lives of the civilian population, but will not necessarily stop the supply of the army. Military cargo can be transported via pontoon crossings and alternative routes. This is worse, slower and more expensive, but does not equal the collapse of the front.

Why strikes on Russia are more dangerous for the Kremlin

The result looks unpleasant for Moscow. Russian strikes on Ukraine are causing great damage and human suffering, but have not yet forced Kyiv to change the political conditions for ending the war. The effect can become critical only with a long blackout, complete blocking of ports or mass destruction of drone production.

So far, none of these goals have been achieved.

Ukrainian attacks on Russia, on the contrary, are increasingly hitting what feeds the Russian war: fuel, oil refining, ports, logistics and the budget. Previously, Athens News wrote about a fire at an oil terminal in St. Petersburg after a drone attack and about other attacks on Russian energy infrastructure: fire at the St. Petersburg oil terminal.

Russia is fighting with its own money. Therefore, every strike on infrastructure that generates revenue, processes fuel, or ensures exports has not only military, but also budgetary significance. And here refineries, terminals, fuel depots and ports become much more sensitive targets than it seemed just a year ago.

What can Moscow do?

The Kremlin has several options left.

• First — dramatically increase the effectiveness of air defense and almost completely close the rear from Ukrainian drones. Judging by reports, Russia is already increasing the use of interceptor drones and strengthening the protection of facilities. But it is not yet clear whether it is technically possible to shoot down almost everything, especially if Ukraine increases the range, number and variety of weapons.
• Second — repeatedly increase missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, trying to achieve a blackout, blocking of ports and paralysis of the military-industrial complex. But this requires enormous resources, accurate reconnaissance and the ability to maintain a high tempo of attacks for a long time.
• Third — go for a dangerous escalation, including expanding the war beyond Ukraine. This scenario carries the risk of a direct clash with NATO and therefore remains the most destructive.
• Fourth – agree to stop the war along the front line, recording the military results already achieved. So far, Moscow is not agreeing to this, hoping to continue the war of attrition.

The score is not yet in favor of Moscow

For now, the Kremlin seems to be choosing to continue the war of attrition without a sharp escalation and without a truce. But this strategy only works under one condition: Ukrainian strikes must not destroy Russian economic stability and must not turn the war from a distant television campaign into a daily problem for the population.

Now the score in the air war is not equal. Russia is causing more destruction and human pain to Ukraine. But Ukraine is increasingly hitting those nodes on which Russia’s ability to pay for and service the war depends.

That is why the coming months will be a test not only for Ukrainian air defense, but also for the Russian economy, logistics and political endurance. If Moscow is unable to stop attacks on the rear, a war of attrition will begin to exhaust not only Ukraine, but also Russia itself.

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