European “Hormuz”: why pressure on the EU is being discussed in Moscow instead of a new war at the front

In the Russian military environment, they are increasingly discussing not the direct defeat of Ukraine, but pressure on Europe as its main rear. In this logic Energy, logistics, tankers and border areas could become the European “Ormuz”. But such a scenario does not lead to peace, but to a dangerous game at the nuclear line.

A new wave of publications in Polish and British media about a possible Russian attack on Poland or the Baltic countries was met with skepticism by many. And not without reason: such forecasts have been made for a long time, and the war in Ukraine, on the contrary, requires more and more resources from Moscow. At first glance, it is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin in such a situation would decide to open another front against the NATO states, which together surpass Russia in economy, population and conventional weapons.

However, the talk itself about the risk of direct pressure on Europe cannot be attributed only to an information campaign. They intersect with a discussion that has been noticeable in recent months in the Russian military and paramilitary environment: if Ukraine does not break under the blows, and Europe remains its main financial, industrial and military rear, then the pressure should be transferred not to Kyiv, but to European infrastructure and political will.

The main thing is several points

• Russian military publics draw an analogy between Russia’s war against Ukraine and the recent confrontation between Iran and Israel and the United States.
• The logic of supporters of this approach is simple: Ukraine is difficult to “break” with attacks on its territory as long as Europe supports it.
• Energy facilities, logistics, terminals, sea routes and border areas are considered as a conditional European “Ormuz”.
• The goal of such pressure, according to this logic, is not the occupation of Europe, but forcing it to reduce support for Ukraine.
• But Europe is not the Gulf countries: the response to a direct attack could be military, including a strike on Russian targets.
• Any such scenario quickly raises the main question: where is the line at which the parties will begin to consider the use of nuclear weapons.

Why is the analogy drawn specifically with Iran?

In Russian discussions, the war in Ukraine is often compared to the confrontation between Israel and Iran. In this scheme, Ukraine finds itself in the role of Israel: a state that may suffer heavy losses, but retains the ability to continue the war thanks to large-scale external support.

In this design, Russia partly assigns itself the role of Iran: a country that cannot quickly destroy the enemy with direct strikes, but is capable of looking for vulnerable points among its allies.

The key thesis of supporters of this approach is as follows: strikes on Ukrainian territory can cause enormous damage, but do not necessarily deprive Kyiv of the opportunity to continue the war. Especially while financial support, supplies of weapons, ammunition, drones and intelligence continue to come from Europe.

European states are indeed increasing their support for Ukraine, including military production, financial assistance and measures to circumvent previous restrictions. London, in its strategic documents, directly names Russia as the most acute threat to European security, and the countries EU continue to discuss additional restrictions in the energy and banking sectors against Moscow. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}

Europe as the main rear of Ukraine

After the reduction of the US role, European countries became even more important for the Ukrainian economy and defense. This isn’t just about money. Europe is involved in the supply of equipment, ammunition, air defense systems, military training, equipment repair and production of drones.

From the point of view of Russian “hawks”, it is this rear area that is the main problem. As long as it works, Ukraine can compensate for losses, hold the front and continue fighting, even if its own industrial and energy infrastructure is regularly attacked.

This gives rise to a dangerous idea: to make Europe not only fear war, but to feel its cost directly on its territory.

What could become a European “Hormuz”

The Strait of Hormuz has become a symbol of the vulnerability of the global economy because much of the seaborne supply of oil and liquefied natural gas passes through it. Any threat to shipping there instantly translates into rising prices, nervous markets and pressure on governments. About a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through Hormuz, as well as significant volumes of LNG from the Gulf countries. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

In the European version of such “Ormuz” we could talk not about one strait, but about a set of vulnerable points:

• oil refineries and fuel terminals;
• ports and liquefied natural gas reception facilities;
• submarine cables, pipelines and offshore infrastructure;
• Baltic routes, Danish straits and shipping areas;
• logistics centers, railway junctions and warehouses;
• pressure on shipping, including around the so-called “shadow fleet”.

Such risks are no longer purely theoretical. In the Baltic Sea, European authorities are recording an increase in navigation problems, including interference with satellite systems, and the topic of tanker safety and sanctioned shipping has become part of a large political battle.

Not to capture, but to scare

It is important to understand: the scenario that proponents of this approach are discussing does not necessarily involve a full-scale Russian invasion of Poland or the Baltic countries.

The logic may be different: a limited strike, sabotage, a naval incident, the seizure of a small area of ​​territory, an attack on infrastructure, or a demonstrative violation of the border. The goal would not be to hold territory, but to create a crisis that would split NATO and force European capitals to argue among themselves.

In Polish publications, this fear is already formulated openly: Russia supposedly can count not on a direct victory over NATO, but on the political indecisiveness of the West, which will prefer negotiations to a military response.

This tactic is based on the assumption that Europeans will not want to risk their well-being, energy supply, economy and quiet life for the sake of Ukraine. This is precisely the main calculation of the supporters of the “European Hormuz”.

But Europe is not the Persian Gulf

There is a serious problem with this design. Europe is not made up of countries that can afford to step aside after a blow to infrastructure or shipping. A direct attack on Poland, the Baltics or another NATO member triggers a completely different logic: pressure on governments will go not only towards negotiations, but also towards a military response.

And here questions arise to which no one can give an exact answer.

• First question: Will Europe limit itself to diplomacy and sanctions or will it strike back at Russian military facilities, fleet, bases and logistics?
• Second question: If hostilities affect the Kaliningrad region, the Baltics, St. Petersburg or Russian military installations, is Moscow ready to raise the stakes to the nuclear level?
• Third question: How will the United States behave, especially if Russia tries to back up the ultimatum with the threat of using nuclear weapons?

It is the lack of a clear answer to these questions that remains the main obstacle. Not humanism, not peacefulness and not trust between the parties. It’s just that no one knows where the “limited signal” will end and a war will begin that can no longer be stopped.

Kaliningrad, the Baltic and the shadow of the nuclear scenario

The Baltic region remains especially dangerous. Russian Kaliningrad, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany, Denmark and key sea routes are nearby here. Any crisis in this space could quickly affect military logistics, civilian shipping, energy and NATO security issues.

It cannot be ruled out that Moscow perceives pressure on Russian tankers, attempts to detain ships, or expanded sanctions against the “shadow fleet” as part of a broader economic offensive. There is already a thesis in Russian and European publications that the fight over tankers could become the next major source of conflict. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}

But turning these disputes into a military response would open the door to unpredictable escalation. Unlike a trade dispute, a missile, naval mine or terminal attack does not have an “undo” function once politicians realize they have gone too far. Humanity, of course, has come up with a lot of ways to press red buttons without reading the instructions.

Editorial comment

The most dangerous part of this story is not that Russia is necessarily preparing a strike on Poland or the Baltic states. There is no direct evidence for such a decision. The danger lies elsewhere: more and more people in Moscow, Warsaw, London and Brussels are starting to build scenarios where a limited strike, a naval blockade, an attack on infrastructure or pressure on shipping are seen as a tool of political coercion.

The problem is that such scenarios only work on paper. On paper, one can assume that Europe will be scared, the US will not intervene, Russia will stop in time, and nuclear weapons will remain in the silos. In reality, each side will make decisions in conditions of panic, incomplete information, pressure from the military, the media and public opinion.

The European “Hormuz” may become not a weak point in Europe, but a trigger for a war that will very quickly cease to be regional.

The most rational way to avoid this scenario remains the same and extremely boring for lovers of geopolitical fantasies: to look for a way to stop the war in Ukraine before attempts to put pressure on the enemy’s rear turn into a direct war between Russia and Europe.

Sources: UK Strategic Defense Review; UK National Security Strategy; “Athens News”: incidents surrounding the Russian tanker fleet; Athens News: Hormuz and rising energy prices.

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