How Europe is being prepared for war: The Telegraph, Axel Springer and the scenario of the “Russian invasion of Poland”

European society is once again being pushed to believe that big war with Russia can literally start in the coming months.

British The Telegraph and Polish edition Onet citing anonymous sources, they reported that the United States allegedly warned Warsaw about a possible armed provocation from Russia or Belarus. Scenarios of attacks on infrastructure, sabotage, attacks drones and even a limited invasion of Polish territory. At the same time, we are not talking about Moscow’s proven plan presented by intelligence data, but about the versions discussed in the security structures.

This is where the main problem begins. Warning about the risks is necessary, especially when Europe lives next to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. But there is a huge distance between professional threat analysis and turning a hypothetical scenario into an emotional headline about an almost imminent attack. This distance is increasingly being erased today.

There is a scenario, there is no proven plan

The materials of The Telegraph and Onet include various options for a possible provocation: an attack by drones or missiles on the Polish energy infrastructure, sabotage, limited penetration of the Russian or Belarusian military, which could then be passed off as a navigation error or a “rescue operation.”

All these options are theoretically possible. But they do not amount to proof that Russia has already decided to invade Poland. Intelligence agencies have a responsibility to plan for worst-case scenarios. They consider not only what will happen, but also what could happen if events go unfavorably.

This is the difference between analytics and mobilization propaganda. Analytics says: “there is a risk, it must be taken into account.” Propaganda says: “the enemy is almost at the border, and therefore any expenses, restrictions and political decisions must be made without question.”

Poland is really at risk

Poland remains a key logistics center for military, humanitarian and political support to Ukraine. Supplies, transport routes, infrastructure connections and the work of numerous organizations related to Ukrainian refugees and Kyiv’s cooperation with the West pass through its territory.

That is why the risk of sabotage, arson, cyber attacks, interference in public conflicts and provocations against infrastructure cannot be considered fiction. The Polish minister coordinating the intelligence services, Tomasz Siemoniak, previously warned of possible Russian attempts to exploit tensions between Poles and Ukrainians, as well as attack targets associated with Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. Reuters

But sabotage and a full-scale war with NATO are not the same thing. In the European information environment, these concepts are increasingly being confused, because the fear of a large-scale war works more powerfully and sells better.

Fear as the basis for new billions

When an anonymous intelligence scenario is turned into a nearly finished picture of a Russian invasion, the public is not just informed, but psychologically prepared for a new era of constant militarization.

In such an atmosphere, it is easier to explain the growth of defense budgets, arms purchases, the expansion of military infrastructure, the deployment of new NATO troops and the reduction in spending on social programs. Citizens are asked to get used to a simple formula: if you doubt the need for new billions for defense, then you allegedly do not understand how close war is.

This is a convenient political construct. Fear creates public consensus faster than parliamentary debate. There is no need to explain long why the government spends huge sums on missiles, drones, bases and contracts with the military industry. It is enough to be reminded every day that Russia can come “tomorrow.”

The problem is that it will not be the owners of defense companies or newspaper editors who will pay for this new era. Ordinary taxpayers will pay: through taxes, inflation, cuts in social spending, rising energy costs and increasingly aggressive security policies.

Axel Springer and the new media architecture

The situation becomes even more interesting if you look at who forms this information flow. On June 30, Axel Springer completed the purchase of Telegraph Media Group for £575 million. The deal made the British The Telegraph part of a large German media concern, which already owns brands such as Bild, Welt, Politico and Business Insider writes Reuters.

Polish Onet operates within the structure of Ringier Axel Springer Polska, a joint business of the Swiss Ringier and Axel Springer. This does not mean that the editors of two publications receive the same text from a single headquarters. But this means that their information fields are increasingly located within the general corporate and ideological environment.

Axel Springer does not hide his value position. The official principles of the concern include support for transatlantic partnership and solidarity with the United States. The company explicitly calls itself transatlantic and states that its employees are committed to upholding these principles.

This in itself does not prove that specific material about Poland was ordered by someone. But it explains why materials about the “Russian threat”, the need to rally around NATO and readiness for confrontation fit so organically into the editorial environment of this media holding.

Kaliningrad is already being called a target

Against the backdrop of reports of a possible Russian provocation, statements by the commander of the German Air Force, Holger Neumann, were made almost simultaneously. He said that in the event of an armed conflict, NATO could strike Russian military targets, including the Kaliningrad region, the Kola Peninsula, the St. Petersburg area and Russian forces in the Black Sea. N.V.

Formally, the discussion was about a response in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO country. But the political effect of such statements is obvious: society is gradually being taught to discuss direct attacks on Russian territory as a working option for a future war. Until recently, such formulations would have been considered extraordinary. Now they are increasingly appearing in news feeds as part of a normal political day.

This is how an escalation spiral works. One side talks about preparing to defend itself, the other perceives it as a threat, after which both increase military budgets, increase rhetoric and create more and more reasons for new fear.

The war has not yet begun, but society is already mobilizing

There is no reliable evidence that Russia is preparing an immediate invasion of Poland. It is unknown whether any provocation will be undertaken and whether there is even a specific plan, which anonymous sources talk about.

But something else is already known: fear of this scenario is turning into a political, financial and media resource. It helps justify new spending, expand military presence, push society towards discipline and declare doubt as a dangerous weakness.

Poland has the right to prepare for threats. Europe has the right to strengthen security. But citizens also have the right to demand evidence rather than live according to the schedule of the next alarming headline. When society has been convinced for months that war is almost inevitable, it stops discussing whether such a policy is necessary, who will profit from it, and why the alternative to it is always declared naive.

This is the real danger: not only in the likely provocation if it actually happens, but in the fact that millions of people are already being taught to live in a state of constant pre-war anxiety. And an anxious society is easier to convince to pay, be afraid and agree.

The material was prepared based on publications The Telegraph, Reuters, Reuters, Axel Springer and open European media reports. Assessments of the political and social impact of publications are an editorial conclusion.

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