Greece supported Finland. Who will support Greece?

Greece supported Finland in the face of the Russian threat, but European solidarity again appears selective: about Turkish pressure on Athens and Cyprus V Helsinki chose not to say.

Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis after a meeting with the head of the Finnish Foreign Ministry Elina Valtonen declared that the security of Europe is indivisible. The formula is beautiful and convenient for diplomatic protocol. The problem is that in practice this “indivisibility” too often ends where the question of Turkey.

The meeting took place in Athens against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, crises in the Middle East, discussions about a new European security architecture and tensions on the eastern flank NATO. In the official part, the parties spoke about asymmetric and hybrid threats, support for Ukraine, maritime security, freedom of navigation, strategic autonomy of Europe and solidarity between states EU And NATO.

According to Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ΥΠΕΞ), Herapetritis emphasized that Greece And Finlandas countries on the southern and northern peripheries of Europe, face common challenges. He said that European security cannot be viewed in fragments: threats in the north and south of the continent are interconnected.

“As states in the northern and southern neighborhoods of the EU and NATO, we face common challenges, asymmetric and hybrid threats, which remind us that Europe’s security is indivisible.”said the head of Greek diplomacy.

Finland, Russia and historical context

Elina Valtonen placed the main emphasis on the Russian threat and the war in Ukraine. According to her, Russia brought war to Europe, and Finland historically understands well what it means to be next to Russian power. She also recalled the Finnish experience of World War II.

However, this historical reference requires clarification. In 1939–1940, Finland actually defended itself against the Soviet offensive during Winter War and retained its independence. But the background to the conflict was more complex than the convenient formula of “a small country against a large empire.” Until 1917 Finland was Grand Duchy of Finland as part of the Russian Empire, and gained independence against the backdrop of the collapse of imperial power and revolution.

By 1939, the Soviet leadership considered the Finnish border too close to Leningradone of the key cities of the USSR. Moscow offered Finland an exchange of territories: to move the border by Karelian Isthmustransfer a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland and provide military guarantees in exchange for compensation in other areas of Karelia. Finland refused, fearing the loss of defensive positions and further pressure from Moscow.

This does not negate the fact that on November 30, 1939, it was the USSR that launched a military operation against Finland. But it also does not allow the whole story to be reduced to a simple scheme without a backstory. For Moscow it was a question of the security of Leningrad. For Helsinki, it is a question of sovereignty and fear of takeover. Diplomacy failed, and the border dispute was settled by war – as too often happens when large states begin to speak in the language of maps and artillery.

NATO at Russian borders

After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Finland abandoned its previous non-aligned status and became a member on April 4, 2023 NATO. For the Finns, this was a decision to defend. For Moscow, this is a sharp deterioration in the strategic situation: the Russian-Finnish border, about 1,340 km long, has actually become a new line of contact between Russia and the Western military alliance.

And here it is worth speaking honestly. Formula “Russia threatens Finland” without context, too convenient for European press releases, but incomplete. Before joining NATO, Finland maintained a non-aligned status for decades. After its entry into the alliance, Russia received another large piece of territory near its borders, bound by collective defense obligations NATO. For any great power, the emergence of a hostile military bloc along a long land border is not a diplomatic detail, but a strategic challenge.

The United States would hardly accept calmly a situation in which Canada or Mexico would join the military bloc with China and would open access to their infrastructure to the Chinese military. Washington would not explain this simply by the “sovereign choice of neighbors.” He would react harshly—diplomatically, economically, intelligence-wise, and militarily. Why is Russia expected to accept expansion? NATO at its borders as a neutral administrative event?

This does not mean justifying war. But this means an honest analysis is necessary. The war in Ukraine was the result not of one reason, but of a whole chain: the expansion of Western influence, the failure of the European security system, the Ukrainian course towards military integration with the West, the conflict in Donbass, Russian fears of NATO and Moscow’s decisions, which led to catastrophic consequences.

Russia has already responded to the Finnish choice by changing its military configuration, including the restoration Leningradsky And Moscow military districts. In other words, we are not talking about a simple picture where one side “peacefully entered into an alliance” and the other “suddenly began to threaten.” We are talking about a new configuration of confrontation: Finland seeks protection in NATO, Russia perceives this as the approach of the enemy’s military infrastructure, and NATO receives new opportunities in the northwestern direction.

Where is Türkiye in this picture?

And this is where the main question begins for Greece. Athens demonstrates allied discipline: it supports Finland, Ukraine, and the common line EU And NATOtalk about the indivisible security of Europe and are ready to discuss threats on the northern flank. But when it comes to Turkish pressure on Greece And CyprusEuropean solidarity suddenly becomes much quieter.

In the public part of the meeting there was no comparable emphasis from Finland in the Turkish direction: neither in the remaining Turkish direction case belli against Greece, neither on politics “Blue Motherland”nor for violations in Aegean Seanor on the occupation of the northern part Cyprus. That is, the threat in northern Europe is recognized as common, but for some reason the threat in the southeast again looks like a “bilateral dispute” that is better left alone so as not to irritate Ankara.

This approach destroys the very idea of ​​indivisible security. If safety Finland after its accession to NATO is a matter for the whole of Europe, then security Greece And Cyprus in the face of Turkish pressure should also be a European issue. It is impossible to demand unconditional support from Athens for its northern allies and at the same time leave Greece itself alone with a problem that Brussels prefers to wrap up in words about “dialogue” and “restraint.”

Maritime security and the “shadow fleet”

Separately Herapetritis spoke about maritime security and freedom of navigation. For Greecea country with one of the largest maritime traditions in the world, this issue is of particular importance. The Foreign Minister stressed that Athens opposes the so-called “shadow fleet”which, according to him, violates international law, freedom of navigation and creates serious risks for the marine environment.

He also reaffirmed Greece’s readiness, when conditions permit, to participate in efforts to protect freedom of navigation in Strait of Hormuz in collaboration with all parties involved. This is an important part of the agenda, especially given the instability in the Middle East and threats to trade routes.

But the same question arises here: if Europe is ready to talk about freedom of navigation in Hormuz, about the Russian “shadow fleet” and about the security of sea routes, why is it so careful when it comes to Turkish pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean? Why does safety of navigation become a principle when it is convenient for the common western line, but turns into a diplomatic fog when it affects the interests of Greece and Cyprus?

Editorial comment

Greek diplomacy must speak more forcefully about this. If Athens supports Finland in the face of Russian military and hybrid activity, then Helsinki and other European partners should at least publicly acknowledge: Turkish pressure on Greece and Cyprus is not a private whim of Athens, but part of overall European security.

Great powers and military blocs act not only according to the letter of international law, but also according to the logic of force. Exactly therefore Russia perceives NATO expansion as a threatA NATO perceives the Russian reaction as a threat to its members. Pretending that one side has the right to move military infrastructure to other people’s borders, while the other should respond only with diplomatic notes, means not analyzing the situation, but serve a convenient political myth.

The same applies to Greece. If Europe recognizes Finland’s fear of Russia, it must also acknowledge Greece’s fear of Turkey. If Helsinki has the right to talk about the security of its borders, Athens has the same right to talk about the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and Turkish pressure. Otherwise “indivisible security of Europe” turns into a beautiful sign, under which some threats are recognized as real, while others are sent to the folder “It’s inconvenient to discuss.”

Greece should not be an ally who always supports others, but only receives advice about patience in return. Allyship is not a one-way street. If Europe wants Athens to be a reliable part of the overall line against Russia, it must be prepared to be equally clear when it comes to Turkey. Everything else is not solidarity, but diplomatic accounting with very selective vision.

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