Is your phone no longer yours? Surveillance of citizens is legalized in Greece

IN Greece a new controversy has erupted over digital surveillance: as it turned out Reporters United, ΕΛ.ΑΣ. And ΑΑΔΕ use Israeli software and hardware solution UFED companies Cellebrite to extract data from mobile phones.

At first glance, this may seem like a technical detail from the world of digital forensics. In fact, the issue is much more serious: government services gain access to a tool that is capable of extracting messages, photos, videos, application data, geolocation and other personal information from the phone. This may include data that the user considered deleted.

According to Reporters United, UFED doesn’t work like spyware Predator or Pegasus: It does not infect the phone remotely, but requires physical access to the device. But this does not make the problem any less serious. If the phone is in the hands of authorities, the system can be used to extract data against the owner’s will.

What is known about the use of UFED

UFED stands for Universal Forensic Extraction Device. This is one of the most famous digital forensics solutions that is used to extract information from mobile devices. Company Cellebrite sells such tools to government agencies in various countries, including law enforcement agencies.

According to the documents referred to Reporters United, ΕΛ.ΑΣ. has and maintains two systems UFED. In addition, in 2021 And 2022 tobacco company Παπαστράτοςsubsidiary structure Philip Morris Internationalconveyed ΑΑΔΕ And ΣΔΟΕ equipment Cellebrite: two systems UFED And Pathfinderdesigned for data analysis.

The mere possession of a digital forensic tool by police or tax authorities is not unusual. In the fight against organized crime, smuggling, financial crimes or serious criminal cases, such technologies may be necessary. But this is where the main question begins: who, when, with whose permission and under what control gets access to citizens’ personal data?

“If you have nothing to hide” is a dangerous trap

The most convenient argument of supporters of total control has been heard for a long time: “If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear”. This is, to put it mildly, weak logic. If it were true, people would live in houses with glass walls, no curtains, no personal correspondence and no closed doors. But for some reason, even the most ardent supporters of transparency are usually hesitant to start with their own bedroom.

Each person has a personal life, correspondence, medical information, family conflicts, financial data, professional contacts and simply private weaknesses that are not intended for the state, boss, political opponent or tax inspector with a sudden interest in someone else’s phone number.

That’s why there are privacy lawsjudicial procedures and rules of admissibility of evidence. In a rule-of-law state, information obtained in violation of the law should not be turned into an instrument of pressure. Otherwise, this is no longer an investigation, but a digital hunt.

The main risk is not technology, but lack of control

The problem is not that the government has digital forensics tools. The problem is that society does not receive clear answers to basic questions. How often is it used? UFED? In what matters? On what grounds? Who approves access to the phone? How is the procedure recorded? Who checks that the extracted data is not used outside the specific case?

After the scandal with Predator such questions cannot be considered paranoia in Greece. The country has already seen how the topic of surveillance of politicians, journalists and public figures is becoming not a conspiracy theory, but the subject of parliamentary, judicial and international discussions. Therefore, the emergence of yet another powerful digital tool without sufficient transparency is inevitably alarming.

Organization Homo Digitaliswhose opinion leads Reporters Unitedindicates that the authorities’ responses raise serious concerns regarding the risk of uncontrolled or disproportionate access to citizens’ data. This is precisely the heart of the problem: technology can be a legitimate investigative tool, but without controls it quickly becomes a means of coercion.

From investigation to blackmail – one political step

The danger of such systems is that the extracted data can be used not only in court. A modern person’s telephone is not just a communication device. This is an archive of his life: correspondence, photographs, contacts, routes, finances, medical applications, work documents, personal conversations.

If access to such an archive is in the hands of a structure without transparent restrictions, there is a risk of political, economic or personal pressure. Journalist investigating corruption; an entrepreneur who refused to “agree”; an official who does not want to participate in the scheme; a politician out of control—they can all become vulnerable not because of the crime, but because of the amount of personal information that can be used against them.

And here it is no longer important whether this information will be formally presented in court. Sometimes a hint, a leak, a selective leak, or the threat of publication is enough. A reputation can be destroyed faster than a person can prove the source is illegal. This is how digital forensics becomes digital baton.

The silence of the authorities only increases suspicions

The most alarming thing about this story is the lack of a clear public explanation. In a democracy, the use of such tools should be accompanied by strict regulations, judicial review, access logs, independent auditing and clear reporting. Not in the “we do everything according to the law, trust us” style, but with real verification mechanisms.

When the state gains the ability to extract virtually all of a person’s personal digital life from a phone, it should not be annoyed by questions, but rather prove in advance that abuse is impossible. Otherwise, citizens are offered the old deal: give us your privacy, and we promise not to misuse it. The promise is wonderful, especially if it is given by people who, even for ordinary parking, managed to build a system of punishments instead of a system of solutions.

A separate issue is the origin of the technology. Cellebrite is an Israeli company whose solutions are used by government agencies around the world. This does not make the tool itself illegal. But when such systems come into the hands of national agencies, especially through donations or opaque procedures, the public has a right to know who gave the state such access to data and under what conditions.

Editorial comment

History with UFED is dangerous not because the police have received technology for investigations. It is dangerous because in Greece trust in control mechanisms has already been undermined. After the case Predator when the authorities were spying on the opposition and journalists without legal grounds, it was difficult for citizens to calmly listen to explanations about “legal use”if at the same time there is no transparency, no independent oversight and no concrete answers.

The state has the right to fight crime. But citizens have the right not to live with the feeling that any telephone can become a source of compromising evidence, and any personal correspondence can become material for pressure. Freedom of speech, independent journalism, political competition and entrepreneurship are impossible where a person constantly thinks not about the law, but about who and when can open his phone.

The question here is simple: UFED Is this an instrument of justice or another door into the gray zone of power? The answer depends not on the capabilities of the program, but on the rules of its application. If the rules are transparent, verifiable and subject to judicial review, it is forensic science. If not, this is no longer a state of law, but a digital parastate with a very modern interface.

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