Reservists are sent to serve in air defense: Will Russia be able to cover oil refineries from drones?

A new wave of messages about calling up reservists for air defense units – Moscow’s attempt close gaping holes in the protection of key infrastructure. The logic is simple: it is no longer possible to recall all the specialists to the front, but leaving the refinery without cover means allowing the economy to slide into even more pleasant chaos for everyone.

Why are drones still getting into refineries?

The paradox of the situation is that the strikes are carried out not by sophisticated missiles, but by slow drones. Such a goal is technically “not elitist”: They can be shot down with machine guns, anti-aircraft guns or simple optics. And yet oil plants are hit regularly. The question is not the lack of funds, but the organizational chaos: who protects a specific object, who is responsible for coordination, where to put the calculations so that the reaction is around the clock?

PMCs from owners

Offers “make a PMC with the money of the refinery owners and give them air defense” — sounds like a great plan for those who like quick outlines and long headings. But the experience with Wagner taught the Kremlin not to trust private military formations: control is slipping, and the consequences are unpredictable. Who guarantees that foreign “Shells” will not become a problem for the state during a political conflict within the country?

Reservists are cheaper, but not immediately more effective

Calling up reservists for air defense can provide a number of people, but not immediate readiness. Air defense is not only a gun and a radar, it also includes coordination, training, equipment, shift logistics and ammunition. Yes, Russia has enough weapons to combat low-speed drones, but distributing them across dozens of facilities, setting up guards and ensuring continuity is a personnel and operational task, and not just a budgetary one.

What will happen in practice

If the scheme works, we will see a reduction in arrivals to remote refineries in the coming weeks. If it doesn’t work, holes will remain, and the country will have an increased burden: mobilization of reservists, new administrative structures and the risk of exacerbation of intra-elite tensions (who, how and at whose expense, protects objects).

Bottom line

Calling up reservists for air defense is not a magic pill. This is a pragmatic step that makes sense only in combination: clear orders, distribution of responsibilities between the army and the Russian Guard, personnel training and control over private initiatives. So far, this looks like an attempt to patch up the crisis quickly and cheaply. Whether it will be successful – time and the number of night flights to the factories will tell.

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