Xi Jinping's leverage: can China encourage Putin to stop the war in Ukraine

French President Macron said that at the upcoming meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in early May, he wants to strengthen a “personal connection” with him so that Xi can influence Vladimir Putin to stop the war in Ukraine.

Other Western countries and the Ukrainian authorities constantly talk about great hopes for China in terms of influence on the Russian Federation. However, will Xi Jinping influence Putin in any way on the issue of the war in Ukraine?

Yes. It's possible. But the key question is how exactly. Beijing is certainly interested in ending the war as quickly as possible. As we have already written, it breaks the main geopolitical strategy of China – to tear Europe away from the United States and prevent EU joined Washington’s tough sanctions against China and restrictions on the access of Chinese goods to the market, if any. But the longer the war goes on, the stronger the US connection with Europe.

At the same time, China has strong leverage over Russia. After the start of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation depends on China both in terms of exporting its goods and in terms of importing necessary products from China (including for the military-industrial complex), which allows the Russian economy to withstand Western sanctions and increase weapons production.

However, at the same time, China is unlikely to be able to induce Moscow to accept the Ukrainian “peace formula” with the withdrawal of all troops to the 1991 borders and the payment of reparations. Since this will be Putin’s actual capitulation, which he will not agree to under any circumstances (especially given the current situation on the front line and provided that stability is maintained within the Russian Federation). And it’s not a fact that Beijing itself wants an option that would look like a complete victory for the West and, above all, the United States. Moreover, relations with Russia are strategically important for China in the context of growing tensions in relations between the PRC and Washington.

The West also has a strong lever of influence on China to encourage it to put pressure on the Russian Federation, in the form of huge Chinese exports to Europe, North America, as well as to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region allied to them (Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan and others ). These volumes are many times greater than Chinese exports to Russia and Beijing naturally does not want to lose them.

But this dependence is mutual. Western countries also depend on the supply of huge quantities of Chinese goods. And the USA and the EU are unlikely to be able to replace them with their own production in the coming years. Even if they launch production of such technologically primitive products as shells with great difficulty, then what can we say about the more complex goods supplied by the Chinese. In addition, large-scale sanctions against China could accelerate its flight from the dollar and euro, which will create additional problems for these currencies. That is, the West does not have any quick solutions that could prompt China to completely break all ties with the Russian Federation and stop supporting it economically.

The United States can, of course, continue to gradually expand sanctions against Chinese companies working with the Russian Federation. But as practice shows, Chinese and Russian companies have already learned to “not show off” their connections; they conduct payments in cryptocurrency, as well as through intermediaries from third countries, or through small banks that are not particularly afraid of American sanctions. If Russia was able to establish large-scale “parallel imports” from Western countries, then doing the same with supplies from China and to China is even more realistic.

However, with all this, there is an option in which China’s influence on Putin to end the war can actually be effective or even decisive. This is stopping the war along the front line (“Korean scenario”). In fact, it is precisely this that is included in the Chinese peace plan, which provides for an immediate ceasefire without the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory.

And inducing Moscow to accept this plan is a very real task for Beijing. Moreover, Russia officially, through the mouths of both Putin and Lavrov, stated that it supports the Chinese plan. And Western media periodically write about signals from the Kremlin about readiness for the “Korean scenario.” In addition, the same option is supported by a significant part of the Russian elite, as well as, according to polls, the majority of the Russian population.

However, there is a version that Putin actually does not want to stop the war along the current front line and intends to fight “to the bitter end.” And both he and Lavrov make statements about support for China’s peace plan only because they are sure that Ukraine will not agree to it. And if suddenly Kyiv and the West agree to the “Korean scenario,” then Moscow may put forward a number of conditions that are unacceptable to them in order to lead the negotiations to a dead end. For example, a sharp reduction in the size of the Ukrainian army, Zelensky leaving his post, the immediate return of frozen Russian assets, etc.

But in this case, it is China that can influence the Russian Federation so that these conditions are removed or softened, and the parties come to a compromise that would allow the war to end along the front line. And this task for Beijing is many times more realistic than inducing Moscow to withdraw troops to the 1991 borders.

Beijing can really find arguments to convince Putin to leave the “tit” (already captured Ukrainian territories) in his hands, and not chase the “crane” (control over all or most of Ukraine) in the sky, if even Putin himself is in control of this “crane” During the current war, he still hopes to catch him (which is not a fact).

The question, however, is that there are no signals from Ukraine and the West about their readiness to agree to stopping the war along the front line. The official position remains the same – access to the 1991 borders. But Beijing is unlikely to be able to help with this. At least, if there are no force majeure events that will dramatically change the situation at the front or inside Russia.

The author's opinion may not reflect the opinion of the editors

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